according to certain conventions (Petts, 1999) . Hereafter, we refer to such procedures under the generic heading of`appraisal'. We can see appraisal in turn as a form of policy analysis, if we interpret the latter as using``multiple methods of inquiry and argument to produce and transform policy-relevant information that may be utilized in political settings to resolve public problems'' (Dunn, 1981 , cited in Fischer, 1995 . (1) These are interesting times for anyone concerned with the theory and practice of appraisal, and with its wider implications. Recent years have seen high-profile policy developments, such as the adoption of the European`SEA Directive' (EC, 2001) , as well as significant evolution in practices at supranational, national, and subnational levels (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2003) . At the same time, fundamental questions are being asked, by theorists and practitioners, about the nature of appraisal and its role in the political process. According to a growing number of critical accounts, both have been inadequately conceptualised (see, for example, Bartlett and Kurian, 1999; Bina, 2003; Dabinett and Richardson, 1999; Flyvbjerg et al, 2003; Owens and Cowell, 2002; Thissen, 2000) . Literatures related to, but not traditionally part of, the main body of work on appraisal are seen increasingly as rich sources of insights into such issues. Most notably, advances in the policy sciences, planning theory, and the sociology of knowledge are beginning to enhance our understanding of current practice and to highlight areas for reform (for recent contributions informed by these perspectives, see Bartlett and Kurian, 1999; Innes, 1998; KÖrnÖv and Thissen, 2000; Rayner, 2003; Saarikoski, 2000) . One effect of this trend, reinforced by experience in practice, has been to undermine the old technical^rational model of appraisal in which`objective assessment' was assumed to lead straightforwardly to better decisions. Instead, attention has been drawn to the complexities of appraisal practices, and to the different, sometimes subtle, ways in which they might secure legitimacy, influence outcomes, and lead to the adjustment of policies. Of particular interest in this context is the potential for practices of appraisal to contribute to a process of learning and, potentially, to modify the belief systems and behaviour of individuals and organisations over time (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 2002; Innes, 1998; Owens and Cowell, 2002; Saarikoski, 2000; Webler et al, 1995) .
In this paper we present an overview of the developments outlined above and offer a preliminary assessment of their implications for theory, practice, and research. We begin our discussion by examining the shortcomings of traditional conceptions of appraisal which, we suggest, have proved theoretically, politically, and practically inadequate. Alternative theoriesödrawn largely from a postpositivist critique of policy analysis öreject the concept of neutral, objective advice and see greater complexity at the interface between`science' and policy. (2) We consider the implications of new perspectives for concepts and practices of appraisal, noting that postpositivist theorists have usually called for more transparent, deliberative, and inclusive processes for informing policy and decisions. We then ask about the relationship between the technical^rational model and the deliberative one that has emerged to challenge it: should we be thinking in terms of a progression from one to the other, or of some form of synthesis, informed by context? This returns us to the concept of learning, and we suggest that an important objective for appraisal should be to foster learning of more than one type. Finally, we outline the areas where we believe future effort in theory building and practice might fruitfully concentrate.
(1) Some authors appear to treat policy analysis and appraisal as effectively synonymous (see, for example, de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 2002) . (2) For brevity, we use the term`policy' to indicate the range of initiatives commonly referred to as policies, plans, and programmes.
The traditional view undermined Analytical procedures intended to inform policymaking and decisionmaking often embody what Weale (2001a, page 378) calls an``implicit political theory'' (see also Bartlett and Kurian, 1999) . Thus traditional conceptions of appraisal have assumed a process in which scientific advice, grounded in a positivist epistemology, translates straightforwardly into the substance of policy, and a`separation of powers' is deemed to exist between neutral, authoritative experts and the decisionmakers whom they advise. In this sense, appraisal could be presented as an objective practice,``valued for its scientific authority'' (House, 1993, page 30) , and its techniques thereby endowed with``numinous legitimacy'' (Clark and Majone, 1985, page 16, after Weber, 1922) . At some risk of simplification, we refer to such conceptions of appraisal and its role in the policy process as the`technical^rational' model.
Though not always present in such a pure form, the technical^rational model can be found reflected in legislative texts, policy rhetoric, and a good deal of academic discussion. (3) Indeed, its hold has been tenacious, despite an extensive and well-developed critique (Weston, 2000) . One reason for this is that``a whole set of institutions have been built around [it] '', including specific practices and professional norms (Innes, 1998, page 54) . Another might be that the`separation of powers' is a useful myth that protects experts and politicians (Rein and White, 1977) . But we should also acknowledge that this conception of appraisal retains intuitive attraction as an ideal, if not as a description of reality: according to In't Veld (2000a, page 7; 2000b) ,``policy makers, social groups and researchers still implicitly cherish the classic concept of objective and value-free knowledge.'' In many quarters, subjective judgments continue to be regarded with suspicion and, as Gandy (1999, page 63) argues, the``messy ambiguities of political debate'' are seen as``an intrusion capable of undermining regulatory efficiency'' (emphasis added). (4) Challenges to the technical^rational model, informed by an accumulated experience of appraisal in practice, have drawn strength from a wider and long-standing critique of positivist forms of policy analysis (for detailed accounts, see Fischer, 1990; Fischer and Forester, 1993; Hawkesworth, 1988; Rein and White, 1977; Torgerson, 1986; Tribe, 1972; Wynne, 1975) and, increasingly, from alternative models of the policy process itself (for an overview, see Radaelli, 1995) . It is recognised, for example, that the assumption of a unitary decisionmaker is an oversimplification of modern democratic polities (KÖrnÖv and Thissen, 2000) and that analysis rarely`informs' policy in the simple linear manner envisaged. Indeed, as In't Veld and de Wit (2000, page 154) point out,``Large quantities of knowledge produced for the benefit of policy are never used in that policy-making'' (emphasis added). This phenomenonöWeiss (1975) calls it the problem of`little effect'öis often attributed to shortcomings in communication, (5) but we must also explain what appears to be wilful neglectöfor example, when projects or (3) For example, the text of the European EIA Directive (EC, 1985) assumes that its effectiveness will derive from the provision of information that will necessarily be taken into account in decisionmaking (Bartlett and Kurian, 1999) . (4) A plea posted on the SEA discussion server for members of the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) provides a nice illustration of this point:``We are trying to develop a better methodology to evaluate our environmental impact assessments, without using subjective reasoning. It almost seems impossible ... How do we measure the impacts _ . How do we compare unquantifiable effects, to those that are quantifiable? ... Does anyone know of an accepted methodology or system for determining impacts of a project that minimizes subjectivity? '' (22 August 2002) . (5) Decisionmakers may be ignorant of bodies of knowledge`out there', or may misinterpret the material that is available. For their part, analysts might misunderstand the kinds of information that would be useful.
policies are pursued regardless of negative assessments. Here, it may be that dominant interests can afford not to learn from appraisal exercises, in line with Flyvbjerg's (1998, page 229) axiom,``the greater the power, the less the rationality''.
In many cases, however, rather than being ignored, the output of particular assessments is invokedöperhaps even deliberately manipulatedöin order to rationalise decisions that have been reached on other grounds. The use of appraisal techniques as`p ost-demonstration of preconceived judgements'' has been widely documented (Bina 2002, page 37; (6) see also Flyvbjerg, 1998; Flyvbjerg et al, 2003; In't Veld, 2000b; Wachs, 1990 ) but this form of rationalisation, or``strategic use of knowledge'' (In't Veld and de Wit, 2000, page 151), is not the only way in which rationality is infused by power. More insidiously, techniques that are ostensibly neutral may in fact have an in-built tendency to support particular outcomes: in road transport, for example, growth-oriented policies have historically been underpinned by particular forms of appraisal (Grove-White, 1997; Owens and Cowell, 2002) . In this, and other areas, commentators have drawn attention to the normative presuppositions hidden iǹ`t he methodological thicket'' of appraisal (Grove-White, 1997, page 26; see also Dabinett and Richardson, 1999; Hajer, 1995; Owens and Cowell, 2002) , exposing an intricate interweaving of facts and values, and showing that the`separation of powers' is an illusion. Some have suggested that governments restrict the kind of analysis performed, to preempt questioning of these implicit assumptions (see, for example, Amy, 1984) . The problemöwell rehearsedöis that ethical and political choices masquerade as technical judgments, reinforcing prevailing norms and existing structures of power. In this sense, the technical^rational model may be described not only as theoretically inadequate (in that it fails to provide an adequate account of the appraisal^policy nexus) but as politically inadequate or naive, and possibly even dangerous (Dryzek, 1990; Durning, 1999; Tribe, 1972) . (7) Arguably, the dangers of technical rationality are at their most acute (and have certainly been manifest most clearly), when the issues at stake are transscientific, in the sense that science is unable to converge upon a solution (Weinberg, 1972 ; see also Lawrence, 1997) , (8) and/or the relevant problems are``unstructured'' (In't Veld and de Wit, 2000, page 150) , such that proponents cannot even agree on problem framings, (9) let alone embark upon a constructive search for solutions. This is becausè`T he boundaries of the problem are diffuse, so it can hardly be separated from other problems. To address the whole problem is more than to address each of its parts. One cannot be sure what disciplines and specialisms are to be invoked for problem solving. Conflicting values and facts are interwoven, and many actors become involved in the policy process '' (Hisschemo« ller and Hoppe, 1996, page 43) . Difficulties arise when a particular problem framing is presumed in appraisal, though it is actually (or potentially) controversial; as a result, conflict over the policies that emerge can become intractable. Such difficulties are intensified with (6) Bina cites interviewees in a study of transport appraisal in Italy, part of a wider European investigation (ECMT, 2004) . the shift to SEA and sustainability appraisal, which deal with greater complexity and significantly larger communities of interest (Bartlett and Oldgard, 2003) . The fundamental importance of framing in this context is well illustrated by the perennial quest to discover which energy (or agricultural, or transport, or waste management) system is the`most sustainable'. Answers are invariably contingent. Reviewing assessments of eight different electricity generating technologies, Stirling (1999, page 119) notes hoẁ`t he ambition to achieve some sort of uniquely robust and transcendent authority'' is undermined by the``intrinsic subjectivity of key framing assumptions and conventions.'' (10) In this particular case, judicious choice of such parameters could result in any ranking of the options being defensible (Stirling, 1999, pages 113^115) .
This brings us to another failure of the technical^rational model: appraisal based on contested judgments or frames loses legitimacy and becomes practically inadequate for delivering reasonably consensual policy outputs (Hisschemo« ller and Hoppe, 1996; In't Veld and de Wit, 2000; Jasanoff, 1997; Wynne, 1982) . Arguably, this was the case in UK transport policy in the 1990s, when established practices of appraisal were replaced by, or at least incorporated into, a broader approach. Critics had long argued that assumptions built into the transport department's cost^benefit analysis, notably about the value of time savings for road users, contributed to a bias in favour of road construction, and justified schemes even when environmental impacts (separately assessed) were likely to be severe (for more detailed discussion, see Owens and Cowell, 2002; Rayner, 2003; Richardson, 2001) . By the mid-1990s, their frustration had spilled into widespread dissatisfaction and protest, and both the road-building policy and associated appraisal practices had become untenable (though such policy reversals may not be permanent, as we shall see).
To summarise so far, a substantive critique of the technical^rational model of appraisal suggests that this conception is inadequate in three (interrelated) ways. It fails to provide a convincing account of observed relationships between analysis and policy (theoretical inadequacy); it can disguise important ethical and political judgments as technical ones ( political inadequacy); and exposure of these shortcomings may result in loss of legitimacy for appraisal techniques and policies; in effect, appraisal based on this model may cease to function ( practical inadequacy). The question then, if we share Scho« n and Rein's (1994, page 37) aspiration for reason and`t he pragmatic resolution of controversies'', is how we might reconceptualise the role of appraisal and make appropriate adjustments to its conduct.
Towards negotiated knowledge?
One clear implication of the argument so far is that appraisal can never be a neutral or objective exercise; indeed, few would now defend such a notion, in spite of the lingering appeal of technical rationality (Beattie, 1995) . A related implicationögiven that neutrality and numinous legitimacy can no longer be assumedöis that appraisal needs to cultivate a new kind of`civil legitimacy', whereby societal agreement``to follow certain rules or consent to certain procedures'' is secured (Clark and Majone, 1985, page 16) . Linking these concerns is the crucial issue of how subjectivity should be handled, and it is on this question (rather than on the existence of subjectivity per se) that significant differences of view become apparent. The most familiar response is that assumptions and judgments should be made`explicit', but still with a strong sense that they should be avoided wherever possible. A more radical (re)emergent view (10) These concerned the scope of appraisal, the choice of indicators and accounting procedures, and the setting of system boundaries. Scoping is increasingly at the centre of attention in SEA (Bina, 2001; Sheate et al, 2001 ), a trend confirmed in presentations relating to diverse contexts at the 21st Annual Meeting of the IAIA (see footnote 7). is that subjectivity is not an intrusion to be minimised but an essential constituent of practical rationality, in which intuition and appreciation of context are regarded as intellectual virtues. For a growing number of commentators, the human capacity for judgmentöand especially for reaching intersubjective judgments through a process of argument and debateöis an asset to be nurtured, and many have argued that, if society is to make the difficult transition towards sustainable development, value rationality must reassert itself against instrumental rationality (see, for example, Flyvbjerg, 1992; O'Neill, 1998; Owens, 1997; RCEP, 1998; Sagoff, 1988; Wilkins, 2003) . It is in this sense that Flyvbjerg (1992; calls for a revival of the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, which refers to practical knowledge or wisdom, especially in the sphere of ethics. (11) This line of reasoning points towards practices of appraisal that seek not to depoliticise policy controversies but to improve opportunities for deliberation in which open dialogue about difficult choices can occur (Fischer, 2000; O'Neill, 1993; Owens, 2000; Stirling, 1999) . Thus it is argued that appraisal exercises need to incorporate competing frames and to demonstrate to those who subscribe to them that their concerns have been treated seriously (Fischer, 1995; Van Eeten, 1999) . Furthermore, for many commentators, and for a variety of reasons, it is axiomatic that these new and more deliberative practices should be inclusive, open to a wider range of voices than has previously been the case. Some see inclusive participation as constitutive of democracy itself. Others stress its``cognitive virtue'' (Pellizzoni, 2001 , page 66), maintaining that incorporation of a range of positional insights improves the quality of decisions. Inclusive practices are further credited with what Pellizzoni (2001) calls`g overnance virtue'', encouraging protagonists in particular controversies to accept ownership of (even unpalatable) outcomes. When successful policy implementation depends on cooperation between a range of interdependent groups, this is seen as an increasingly important quality (Booher and Innes, 2002; de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 2002; Fischer, 1995; .
Such thinking has not been without effect on practices of appraisal in a variety of contexts. In the Netherlands, according to Voogd (1997) , the pretence of objectivity in ex ante assessment has largely been abandoned in many policy areas in favour of efforts to arrive at more consensual`negotiated knowledge'. In the United Kingdom, the so-called new approach to appraisal (NATA) in transport planning, developed since 1998, marks a departure from prior practice in that sector (Tomlinson, 2004) . By offering a more open and transparent process, and providing scope for dialogue about problem definitions and criteria for policy success, NATA was meant to avoid the kind of backlash over transport infrastructure witnessed in the 1990s (Rayner, 2003) . If we look at the wider situation, a review of transport assessment practices in seven European countries ö Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom ö notes the increasing use of multicriteria analysis, involving more open debate over values and priorities (ECMT, 2004) . Further interesting cases have been documented in the field of waste management: Saarikoski (2000) discusses an attempt to develop waste policy for the Helsinki region of Finland through an inclusive process of strategic environmental impact assessment (see also Saarikoski, 2002) , and Webler et al (1995, page 446 ) describe a Swiss example of appraisal through`c ooperative discourse''. An important implication of these developments is that institutions have learned from experience that the process of appraisal can be at least as important as its content.
(11) In contrast to episteme, concerning theoretical know why, and techne denoting technical know how.
Or not?
We should not leap to the conclusion, however, that all problems would be resolved if practices grounded in technical rationality gave way to deliberative and inclusive approaches. For one thing, new procedures do not always mark as radical a departure as is sometimes implied, in terms of either process or outcome. In the UK case cited above, a form of cost^benefit analysis is retained within NATA, forecasts of future traffic levels remain the subject of intense dispute, and the government has reverted to a policy of large-scale road-building following a series of`multimodal studies' (Tempest, 2003) . Elsewhere in Europe, although more open and broad-based approaches are increasingly the norm, they are regarded as complementing rather than replacing traditional cost^benefit analysis (Bina, 2004) . Looking for lasting impacts on practice (and policy outcomes) across different sectors, we see decisionmakers still routinely appealing to technical rationality in the context of difficult choices, and we see practitioners of appraisal sometimes focusing their efforts on the refinement of techniques, whilst ignoring concerns about their civil legitimacy. Overall, it seems fair to conclude that, despite new rhetoric and a degree of experimentation, criticism of the technicalr ational model has had rather little impact on conceptions or practices of appraisal or indeed of policy analysis more broadly defined (for a useful review, see Durning, 1999) .
Why is this? One answer might be that there simply has not been time for new practices to become institutionalised. Another is that there are aspects of the`old' model that rightly retain some appeal, an issue to which we return below. But a third, and significant, factor is that despite their persuasive diagnosis of problems, critics of technical rationality have failed to provide a coherent alternative paradigm; there are substantial, unresolved difficulties (conceptual and practical) with inclusive deliberation, and it is far from clear that such approachesöany more than traditional onesöcan avoid the problem of`little effect'. We cannot do justice here to the multiplicity of issues raised, but note that questions about representation, discursive competence, and political process go to the heart of any conception of democracy (for further discussion, see Bartlett and Oldgard, 2003; Foster, 1997; Hajer and Kesselring, 1999; O'Neill, 2001; Owens, 2000; Owens and Cowell, 2002) . Time and resource costs may be secondaryöbut nevertheless limitingö factors (for an interesting analysis, see Dahl, 2000) . Of particular relevance to our discussion, however, is the prospect that more deliberative and inclusive appraisal exercises may do little more than uncover a fundamental clash of frames, serving merely to``excavate and expose the structure of the deadlock'' (Van Eeten, 1999, page 16) . Although this may be preferable to imposing a given (contested) frame, it does not point clearly to a constructive way forward. As Van Eeten (2001, page 425) puts it:`F aced with so much variation [in values and frames], proposals that assume clear outcomes from deliberative democracy fall dangerously short for praxis and for theory. The crux of the theoretical problem is that nobody has yet provided an approach, let alone an answer, as to how to process this variation.'' Thus the assumption that more deliberative and inclusive approaches to appraisal will lead to clear recommendations upon which decisionmakers can act may be an heroic one. In defence of new procedures, it might be argued that we should in any case abandon the objective of reaching definitive recommendations (particularly the search for the`best' course of action) and settle for fostering mutual learning among protagonists in policy controversies. This is an important objective, and we revisit it below. Still, we cannot avoid the need to decide and to act, and we should be mindful of Weale's (2001b, page 419) concern that``if the process [of public deliberation] invites an articulation of fundamental values but leads to an irreconcilable clash of values, then the goal of increasing legitimacy _ may recede.'' All of this suggests that appraisers and policymakers might well be confused. The comforting prospect of objective, ex ante assessment of the implications of particular proposals recedes into a morass of system complexity and issue intractability. Deliberative and inclusive processes are upheld as an alternative to technical rationality but seem difficult, expensive, time consuming, and (to the discomfort of decisionmakers) potentially inconclusive. Some may suspect that neither the old nor the new approaches will have very much influence on outcomes, other than by happy coincidence. And in the meantime, there is relentless pressure for policies to be adopted, programmes instigated, and decisions made. We need to look again, then, at substantive claims about the nature and role of appraisal and in particular at the divide between technical and deliberative rationality that has characterised much of the literature and debate in recent years. As we now go on to argue, this dichotomy may in fact have been unhelpful.
Beyond polarisation?
We offer three reasons to reject such polarisation. First, neither the technical^rational position nor the postpositivist critique is as purist, or its advocates as intransigent, as is often implied. Second, experience suggests that even quite technical procedures have, as an unintended effect, provided important apertures for deliberation and learning; to see them`merely' as exercises in technical rationality, therefore, would be to underestimate their influence over time (Owens and Cowell, 2002, page 71) . (And it may be that different practices can stimulate different forms of learning that ought to be combined within a broader strategy.) A third reason is that we can identify both a need and an opportunity for sensitive selection or constructive combination of approaches, taking account of both the object and the objective of appraisal in particular contexts. We now examine each of these arguments in turn.
Paper tigers?
The first can be dealt with rather briefly. Like many dichotomies, that between the technical rationalists and their critics has been perpetuated and exaggerated by the inevitably reductionist accounts that have come to represent their views. Although there are, of course, die-hards on both sides, examining what people actually claim can reveal a degree of humility and accommodation. For example, we do not find many theorists or practitioners of conventional forms of appraisal adhering to the technical^rational model in its extreme form (see Durning, 1999) or explicitly advocating a closed, expert-driven system: rather, they have often accepted in principle, and occasionally sought in practice, a role for public or stakeholder engagement. [What we can say is that this latter aspect of appraisal has not been highly developed to date (Bina and Vingoe, 2000; Owens and Cowell, 2002) .] Similarly, critics of technical rationality, while emphasising the centrality of judgment, rarely advocate the wholesale rejection of formal, evaluative techniques; it is widely accepted that systematic and scientific treatment remain useful in many forms of enquiry [Van der Knaap (1995) offers a cogent defence, in the context of evaluation; see also RCEP (1998) ; Weale, (2001a) ]. Such views are suggestive of scope for constructive dialogue.
Learning by default?
The second reason to challenge polarisation is an intriguing one. Experience in the land-use planning arena, where appraisal (particularly in forms such as EIA) has a long history, suggests that procedures widely regarded as technocratic can in practice provide a forum for dialogue``within which knowledge can be assembled, argument can take place, and learning may occur within and between different coalitions'' (Owens and Cowell, 2002 , page 71; see also Innes and Connick, 1999) . We might postulate that even in practices that are not self-consciously deliberative, and even when analysts complain that their work has had`little effect', various forms of learning may in fact occur. Such learning may be of a rationalist kind, in which participants accept new facts and come to recognise errors within their own belief systems, or it may involve more fundamental reframing, as actors engaged in (say) EIA of successive projects repeatedly encounter alternative world-views and are confronted by new arguments and ideas. Thus conventional appraisal might, over time, result in``double-loop learning'' (Argyris and Scho« n, 1978) , (12) involving challenges to the status quo scarcely contemplated by those who commission the various assessments and inquiries.
Sensitivity to context
The third point follows, and is the subject of increasing attention: technical and deliberative processes need not be mutually exclusive, but the context in which appraisal occurs should be a crucial determinant of which approach, or combination of approaches, to adopt. Both the object of appraisal (what is being appraised, what kinds of questions are being asked) and its objective (the end to which the appraisal is being conducted) matter (Bina, 2003) . Specialists still command`numinous legitimacy' in addressing certain kinds of questions. But when there is sensitivity to key assumptions, significant uncertainty, and (most importantly) divergent framings of the questions overall, there are powerful arguments for deliberative approaches, engaging divergent perspectives. This is not to regress into simplistic, fact^value distinctions. What we envisage is a continuum from well-structured problems to severely`unstructured' ones (where consensus on the relevant parameters is missing), with an increasing need, across this spectrum, for dialogue and the inclusion of different knowledges and positions. At each point, we might argue that appraisal should be concerned with knowledge that is practically adequate (Blake, 1999) and defensible, whether in a formal, scientific sense or otherwise in terms of argument, experience, and observation. (We note in passing that the typical categorisation of claims as`expert' or`lay' rarely tells us enough about their defensibility.)
Reflecting such considerations, the emergence of typologies linking appraisal types to particular contexts can be seen, including recommendations regarding the appropriate extent and form of participation (Bartlett and Oldgard, 2003; KÖrnÖv and Thissen, 2000; Van Eeten, 1999 ; for an earlier contribution, see Schefer and Kaess, 1990) . (13) As KÖrnÖv and Thissen (2000, page 198) argue, account should be taken of`t he nature and context of the decision situation, the style and culture of the actor network, the mutual dependencies and fundamental interests of the actors, [and] requirements in terms of openness and democratic nature.'' There is also growing awareness that different approaches might fruitfully be combined. For example, in the context of complex and nonconsensual issues, deliberation can be seen not as an alternative to technical analysis but as a fundamental requirement for the framing of, and analytical rigour in, such analysis (deliberation, in other words, has`cognitive virtue'). Stirling (1999, page 127) , in advocating a combined approach, maintains that it is only through public deliberation that technical analysis can gain``the essential empirical inputs concerning the selection, definition and prioritisation of the appraisal criteria.'' (12) In contrast,`single-loop learning' entails improved understanding of the means by which established policy goals can best be attained. For useful reviews of an extensive literature on policy learning, see Bennett and Howlett (1992) and Van der Knaap (1995) . (13) Such contributions are particularly germane in the context of the European SEA Directive, suggesting that the emphasis should be on flexible approaches and a wide range of methods and processes. Mindful of time pressures, for example, Bartlett and Oldgard (2003) have proposed that where other consultative mechanisms are well-developed it may be possible for SEA to be conducted without substantive public consultation. Van Eeten (2001, page 423) arrives at a similar synthesis from a different direction, suggesting that``Paradoxically, for public involvement to be deliberative, we need analytical tools, commonly associated with`the experts'.'' Learning, both in terms of acquiring a particular level of technical knowledge and in its more discursive form involving factv alue relations, becomes a conscious objective of combined approaches: it is in this sense that Van der Kerkhof et al (2001) discuss a combination of`cognitive' and`argumentative' approaches in a participatory integrated assessment of climate change in the Netherlands.
Appraisal and policy
A final comment should be made about the role of appraisal in the wider political process. We have already touched upon this when considering the problem of`little effect', which might variously be attributed to inadequacies in the appraisal itself, to looking for the wrong sorts of`effects' (such as decisions taken in the immediate aftermath of the appraisal process), or to the exercise of economic and political power by those for whom the results might be inconvenient. As noted above, it is far from clear that new approaches to appraisal will have any greater`effect' than traditional forms, in which the implicit (and, we have argued, erroneous) model is that analysis informs' policy in a relatively straightforward manner. A related problem is what Van Eeten (2001, page 424) has described as the``missing link'' of deliberative democracy, referring to the fact that connections between new participatory practices and the formal institutions of representative democracy are often only vaguely defined (see also Owens and Cowell, 2002) . There is an implicit dilemma here that suggests a need for reflexive research of the kind that we propose in the next section. Early involvement of elected decisionmakers risks turning processes into``political front-stage performance [s] that [reinforce] existing positions'' (Van Eeten, 2001, page 424). But if they are not involved, outputs may fail to win political commitment and important opportunities for reciprocal learning are lost. Interestingly, one of the findings of the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) research mentioned earlier was that decisionmakers (particularly elected ones) should be involved at an early stage in the appraisal exercise (ECMT, 2004) . The more general problem is that the mechanisms through which practices of appraisal actually impinge upon policymaking and decisionmaking processes (or not, as the case may be) remain poorly understood and underresearched. If attention has shifted, in the theory and practice of appraisal, from content to process, it has yet to encompass outcomes in any significant degree.
Researching appraisal and research in appraisal ö where next?
We now need to draw together this wide-ranging discussion and identify fruitful directions for further work. It might be useful, first, to summarise our argument with regard to appraisalöbroadly definedöas it is currently conceptualised and employed in the policy process. We have suggested that significant advances in policy and practice have come at the same time as adoption of a wider range of theoretical perspectives, so that it is an appropriate moment to reflect on the implications ofö and potential synergies betweenösuch developments. The technical^rational model of appraisal has been subjected to a trenchant critique, and practices grounded in it have sometimes lost legitimacy to the extent that it has become a political necessity to replace them. Such experiences, as well as insights from a range of theoretical perspectives, point to the need for more open, transparent, and deliberative approaches to appraisal, and in some cases new procedures have been tried or adopted as a result. Still, we find that the`old' model retains a powerful hold both on concepts and on practices of appraisal, and newer ones ödespite much enthusiasm and a degree of experimentation in practiceöhave had rather limited impacts on outcomes and policies to date. This leads us to conclude, along with a number of other commentators, that both technical and deliberative approaches, as typically represented, have shortcomings, and that the most constructive way forwardöagain being tested to some extentöis likely to involve a careful tailoring of different forms of appraisal to specific problems and situations. In this sense, we suggest that the polarisation that has characterised much recent commentary may be unhelpful.
This bare outline begs a number of important questions for both the theory and the practice of appraisal. It is an empirical observation, for example, that controversial techniques can`ride out' criticism for many years but sometimes become untenable. We are still far from understanding the processes through which legitimacy is maintained without difficulty, questioned with little impact, or forfeited to such a degree that policies and practices have to be modified. Arguably, techniques that produce numbers, such as economic appraisal and risk assessment, have a particularly powerful fascination for decisionmakers, proving difficult to dislodge even when inadequacies are repeatedly exposed. We would do well to consider in more detail the vulnerabilities of different appraisal techniques and their resistance in the face of critique. The reasons for change when it does happen in certain sectors, or at particular political moments, are not always clear. To take an example discussed above, we might attribute the NATA in UK transport policy to a rationalistic form of learning within policy communities öa recognition that the`old' approach was flawed. But it is clear that by the late 1990s, other (political and economic) factors were demanding changes in transport policy, so that appraisal methods likely to support different decisions (in this case less road building) could be accepted. This would suggest that the general political climate, and dominant discourses in any given policy sector, can preempt or permit certain kinds of analysis at different times. In-depth research by Rayner (2003) suggests that both kinds of process were in operation and in this instance were mutually reinforcing. Further work of this kind, which may of necessity be retrospective, needs to be conducted in a range of different sectors and contexts.
We observe that when changes do take place they may not be complete, nor do they necessarily have lasting and significant effects on outcomes. This raises another important set of questions. How do attempts to gain civil legitimacy, by adopting new approaches to appraisal, actually work in practice? Can subjectivity successfully be reframed as practical reason (or under what circumstances is this possible)? When appraisal practices become more open, deliberative, and participatory, allowing for full acknowledgement of uncertainty and different framings, can policies still be formulated and decisions made, and do they differ from those that might have emerged from the`old' approaches? Again, it would seem that these important questions can be answered only through patient empirical work in well-defined contexts, involving observation (sometimes as an active participant), documentary analysis, and in-depth interviews with those involved in the process over time. The work of Saariskoski (2000; , Rayner (2003) , and Webler et al (1995) provides interesting precedents. So does that of de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof (2002) , who draw upon case studies in the Netherlands to develop principles of`process design' for appraisal, particularly with a view to achieving consensus when there are multiple and conflicting perspectives on the issues at stake. More research of this kind would improve our understanding of the processes at work and might usefully be conducted alongside cross-sectional and multinational studies of the kind carried out for the ECMT (2004) , which draw upon the experiences of those who have regularly been involved in appraisal. We are tempted to observe that a great deal has been written about the virtues of different approaches to appraisal but rather less has been done to test the various claims through meticulous empirical work. Developments in both theory and practice are likely to flow from such research.
One of the most interesting questionsöhow, if at all, practices of appraisal provide spaces for dialogue and learning of various kindsöneeds to be addressed not only in the context of fora that consciously seek to promote such outcomes (those that might be said to adopt a learning strategy) but also in quasi-technical practices where there is some evidence that learning (amongst regular participants and, ultimately, in a wider policy community) can occur over time; studies of the latter might provide useful lessons on how to nurture constructive elements in the design of modified appraisal procedures. The newer, deliberative, and mixed approaches also need to be scrutinised, as noted above. In both cases, we have to ask: what kinds of learning might be looked for in practices of appraisal across various policy domains, and by what means are they to be detected and explored? There are interesting pointers from recent work. Saarikoski (2002) , for example, suggests that the degree of incommensurability between frames can be exaggerated and the potential for learning of a rationalist kind underestimated. In the Finnish waste management case (Saarikoski, 2000) , although participants did not change their basic framing of the issues (for example, environmental groups continued to see waste generation, rather than waste management, as the fundamental problem), they were able to agree on what the key decision criteria ought to be (diverging from each party's initial preferences) and on a new waste management option that allowed them to move away from their initial polarised positions. A further important question suggested by such findings relates to how enduring are any new positions or values`learned' in processes of appraisal. What makes for lasting changes in perspective, which translate into the substance of policy?
It is clear that to answer such questions we need well-designed longitudinal work, with retrospective elements where necessary combined with (and sometimes incorporating)`real time' studies of appraisal processes as they are happening. A generous time frame is essential if we are to detect subtle and long-term processes of`knowledge creep' and`enlightenment', of a kind that might eventually lead to significant reframing of policy problems. There are questions about depth and breadth of analysis too and, in particular, a need, identified by Innes (1990; among others, to be sensitive to the variety of ways in which knowledge and information are used. Alongside more formal, technical information, she argues, the experience of participants, the stories they tell, the images and representations they invoke in discussion, and their intuitionö``their personal sense of the situation and of the other participants'' öare forms of information worthy of researchers' attention and may play a role even when appraisal exercises are intended to be essentially technical (Innes, 1998, page 59) . Innes also acknowledges (1998, page 53) that the role of information in these terms is`f ar more difficult to isolate and describe''. Saarikoski's (2000) Finnish case study provides an example of sensitivity to these issues. Through documentary analysis, participant observation, and successive in-depth interviews at key stages of the assessment, she is able to trace how joint fact-finding allowed new understandings to emerge and individuals' views to change. Interestingly, Saarikoski's study confirms Forester's (1999) view that, in addition to facts and values, participants' social identities must be considered if more deliberative appraisal practices are to be successful and common ground identified. In the Finnish case, although a professional waste manager's concern to be seen to operate at the`cutting edge' made him wary of proposals for`soft' strategies, environmentalists were fearful of co-option and suspicious of the motives behind suggestions from government and business.
It is certain that research on appraisal will proceed in parallel to innovation in practice and that experimental approaches should themselves become the subject of careful monitoring and observation. We might envisage, in this context, a process of reflection, in which lessons learnt from spontaneous instances of reframing are incorporated into proposals for improved`design rationality' in policymaking . One might imagine, for example, de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 's (2002) principles of process design, derived from empirical observation, being incorporated into new processes that could subsequently be monitored and evaluated. Calls for greater sensitivity to the roles and identities of actors (Innes, 1998; KÖrnÖv and Thissen, 2000; Saariskoski, 2002 ) also have interesting implications for practitioners. Analysis of``the positions, interests and interrelations of the actors involved'' (KÖrnÖv and Thissen, 2000, page 199 ) might usefully inform the techniques that constitute an appraisal, and insights arising in this process might help to identify creative and workable solutions (compare Van Eeten, 1999) . (14) It is significant that procedures such as EIA, risk assessment and cost^benefit analysis tend to be structured fairly rigidly, in a manner that does not generally provide opportunities for such issues to be addressed (Saarikoski, 2000) .
Finally, much of the above concentrates on the appraisal process, on the roles of and effects on participants, and on the potential (through different approaches) to produce useful outputs. This leaves unaddressed the crucial question of connections between appraisal and the policies and decisions (and, ultimately quality of life and environment) that it is meant to influenceöthe question of outcomes, rather than outputs. There remains a dearth of empirically strong, theoretically informed analysis in this area, and assumptions (implicit theories of the policy process) abound. Thus we strongly endorse KÖrnÖv and Thissen's (2000, page 199 , emphasis added) call for a broadening of perspective:`e valuative and comparative research should be broadened beyond evaluation of the qualities of the assessment process and its direct products _ The use of assessment results in, and their impacts on, decision making should also be observed, as well as the contextual conditions within which the assessment was performed and how [it] was designed to match those conditions. In addition, a sufficiently broad set of possible impacts should be monitored, including impacts relating to the learning of participants and the social structure.'' In exploring the interface between appraisal and policy, we are inevitably asking questions about rationality and power (Flyvbjerg, 1998) and seeking to explain stability and change in both the short and the longer term. No assessment of the role of appraisal will be adequate if it is``divorced from fundamental questions of agency and leverage over the political process'' (Owens and Cowell, 2002, page 70) . We should be mindful of Radaelli's (1995, page 160) assertion that``the theoretical challenge is not to ... select an ultimate answer about the weight of poweröthe traditional`core' of political science öand knowledge, but, rather, to develop an analytical treatment of such questions as when and how knowledge matters in the policy process.'' Adding to this the crucial dimension of the kinds of knowledge that matter, we can identify a final and important set of questions about appraisal and its role in the shaping of policy.
